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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - NINTH CIRCUIT
SETS FORTH INDEPENDENT FUNCTION OF CERCLA
AGAINST OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
REGULATING HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL:
LOUISIANA-PACIHPC CORP. V. ASARCO, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulation of the treatment, transportation, storage, and dis-
posal of mineral processing waste has proven problematic for the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1 As the ad-
ministrative agency charged with regulating all forms of hazardous
waste, EPA has spent nearly two decades determining whether cer-
tain mine processing wastes should be regulated as hazardous.2
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) 3
gives EPA the authority to oversee and regulate the treatment,
transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous substances which
pose a threat to human health and the environment. 4 As part of its
responsibilities under RCRA, EPA outlined a unique category of
wastes which, though high in volume, contained relatively low levels
1. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1316, 1318-24 (D.C. Cir.
1988). See also 53 Fed. Reg. 41,288 (1988) (outlining history of mining waste
exclusion).
2. For a discussion of EPA's regulation of mine processing wastes, see infra
notes 34-64 and accompanying text.
3. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), §g 3001-5006,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-56 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. See Bradley S. Hiles & Robert F. Wilkinson, Bevill Amendment: Burning Haz-
ardous Waste in Cement Kilns, 55 Mo. L. REv. 391 (1990) (discussing EPA's role in
modifying country's waste disposal laws). See also Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and
Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive
Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047, 1055-56 (1994) (commenting
on RCRA's definition of hazardous waste).
Other federal statutes govern hazardous waste disposal, including the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Marine Protection, Re-
search and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1414b (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Gerrard,
supra, at 1055 n.20.
(181)
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of toxicity.5 Congress, through the Bevill Amendment,6 excluded
this "special wastes" category from RCRA regulation in order to give
EPA time to study these wastes and to determine their potential
harm to human health and the environment. 7 One such special
waste is the copper ore processing waste slag.8
The Bevill Amendment, with its regulatory exclusions under
RCRA, is incorporated in subsection 101(14)(C) of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
5. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 393. EPA's proposed regulations,
promulgated in 1978, created a "cradle to grave" program to regulate all aspects of
hazardous waste handling and disposal. Id. Part of this program involved the man-
agement of waste. Id. In this part, EPA developed a category of wastes known as
"special wastes" which are characterized as being high volume, low hazard. Id.
Special wastes encompassed wastes from the extraction, beneficiation, and process-
ing of ores and minerals which include slag waste, a byproduct of the processing of
copper. Id. at 393 n.14.
6. RCRA § 3001(b) (3) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (3) (A) (enacted as part of the
amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). This amendment is named after Alabama Representative
Thomas Bevill, who offered this measure to temporarily exclude mining wastes
from RCRA regulation until EPA had a chance to study and rule on the appropri-
ateness of such exclusions. See Gerrard, supra note 4, at 1067; see also Hiles & Wil-
kinson, supra note 4, at 391-92, 394-95 (noting Congressman Bevill's successful
introduction of the amendment); Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1328
(noting only minor modifications to the amendment prior to adoption). Explain-
ing his purpose for proposing the amendment, Congressman Bevill stated:
[I] t would require EPA to defer imposition of regulatory requirements on
the disposal of the waste by-product of fossil fuel combustion, of dis-
carded mining materials and of cement kiln dust waste until after EPA
has completed studies to determine whether, if at all, these materials
present any hazard to human health or the environment.
Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1328 (citing 26 CONG. REc. 3361 (1980)).
With regard to EPA's 1978 classification of "special wastes," Congressman Bevill
commented:
EPA has itself recognized that it has "very little information on the com-
position, characteristics, and degree of hazard posed by these wastes." In
its announcement, printed in the Federal Register of December 18, 1978,
EPA announced it did not have data on the effectiveness of current or
potential waste management technologies or the technical or economic
practicability of imposing its proposed regulations. In that same an-
nouncement EPA also stated that it believed that any potential hazards
presented by the materials "are relatively low."
Id. In conclusion, Bevill defended his amendment as "requir[ing] EPA to
promptly undertake studies to fill these gaps in the agency's knowledge, and to
determine whether there is any health or environmental problem from the dispo-
sal of these coal by-product wastes and other materials listed [in] the amendment."
Id. See Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1328-29 (summarizing other House
floor discussions).
7. See Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 393 (discussing Congress' recogni-
tion of unique problems associated with management and disposal of "special
wastes" due to insufficient data on their hazards and potential dangers).
8. For a discussion of the special wastes category, see infra notes 34-64 and
accompanying text.
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of 1980 (CERCLA). 9  Section 101(14) defines hazardous sub-
stances for the purpose of imposing CERCLA liability for the
cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.10 Since the focus
of RCRA and CERCLA are slightly different in scope, the question
that arises is whether the exclusion of certain hazardous wastes
from regulation under RCRA implies a similar regulatory exclusion
under CERCLA once the latter incorporates the former's exclusion
provisions." To date only a handful of federal courts have ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Bevill Amendment, as an excep-
tion to CERCLA subsection 101(14)(C), is also an exception to
section 101(14) regulation entirely.'2
9. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See
also CERCLA § 101 (14) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (C) (incorporating Bevill Amend-
ment under RCRA).
10. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). The section states:
"hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant to
section 1321(b) (2) (A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture,
solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title,
(C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or
listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.
§ 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the
Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended
by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a)
of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of
the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 74121, and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator
has taken action pursuant to section 2602 of Title 15. The term does not
include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term
does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or
synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such syn-
thetic gas).
CERCILA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
11. CERCLA is retrospective in nature and imposes liability once hazardous
substances have contaminated the environment and/or caused injury to natural
resources. Rufus C. Young, Jr., Beyond Superfund: Other Federal Hazardous Substance
Related Laws Affecting Land Use C930 ALI-ABA 173, 176-177 (1994). RCRA, on the
other hand, is prospective in nature and is meant to regulate the generation, trans-
portation, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. Id. at 177.
12. Several federal district courts and one appellate circuit court have ad-
dressed whether the Bevill Amendment exclusion as applied to RCRA regulation
implies a similar exclusion under CERCLA. SeeJudith V. Royster, Mineral Develop-
ment in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TuLsA
L.J. 541, 633-34 & n.594 (1994); see also Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 699 F. Supp.
827, 833 (D. Idaho 1987) (finding suspension of mining waste regulation under
RCRA not fatal to regulatory claims under CERCLA); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co.,
635 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D. Idaho 1986) (concluding statutory language, case law,
and EPA's administrative interpretation support CERCLA regulation of mining
waste); Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. United States EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 929-30
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (concluding by "clear language of [CERCLA] section 101(14)"
exclusion under one subsection does not prevent regulation by another subsec-
1996]
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In Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc.,13 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO)
was liable under CERCLA to site owners who purchased slag from
ASARCO for the cleanup of heavy metal contamination found at
the sites despite slag's Bevill Amendment exclusion from CERCLA
regulation under subsection 101(14)(C).14 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's assessment of comparative fault liability
on ASARCO under CERCLA. 15 In reaching its conclusion, the
ASARCO court followed the reasoning of the district court, noting
that the specific Bevill Amendment special wastes, incorporated in
subsection 101 (14) (C) of CERCLA, are neither excluded individu-
ally16 nor in their component forms from regulation under the
other subsections of section 101(14). 17 In so holding, the Ninth
Circuit relied upon statutory construction and plain language to in-
terpret CERCLA section 101(14).1 8 The court also discussed the
appropriate standard ofjudicial review of an administering agency's
interpretation of statutory language as enunciated in prior United
States Supreme Court decisions.19 Based upon these considera-
tions, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the Bevill Amendment has
no bearing on whether slag in its component forms is excepted
from the other subsections" of CERCLA section 101 (14).2 0
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
a jury finding that slag is a product under state law precludes a
court finding that slag is waste under CERCLA.21 The court held
that the sale of slag can simultaneously be the sale of a product
tion); United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D. Ariz.
1984) (holding CERCLA § 101 (14) (C) exclusion of mine and mill waste does not
operate to completely exempt CERCLA regulation). Contra United States v. Iron
Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (concluding plain
meaning of section 101 (14) completely excludes from CERCLA regulation special
wastes listed in Bevill Amendment). This contrary holding, however, is superseded
by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 24 F.3d
1565 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 780 (1995).
13. 24 F.3d 1565. For a detailed discussion of the history of this case and re-
lated cases, see infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
14. Id. at 1569.
15. Id. at 1570, 1572. ASARCO was assessed with 79% - 100% liability for
CERCLA cleanup costs under theory of comparative fault. Id. at 1572.
16. See Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 930.
17. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1573-74.
18. Id. at 1573.
19. Id. at 1573-74. For a discussion of the appropriate standard of judicial
review, see infra note 96 and accompanying text.
20. Id. at 1573.
21. Id. at 1574-75.
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under state law and the disposal of hazardous waste under CER-
CLA.22 In reaching its conclusion, the ASARCO court distinguished
the objectives of the two laws: the state law focusing on common law
products liability, and the federal law addressing environmental
concerns.23 The court found no conflict of law issue since CERCLA
is "designed to facilitate the cleanup of waste that threatens the en-
vironment"2 4 and is not meant to "treat the consuming public, the
product seller, the product manufacturer, and the product liability
insurer in a balanced fashion" with respect to unsafe products. 25
This Casebrief first surveys the historical development of ore
and mineral processing waste regulations under federal law.26
Next, this Casebrief traces the facts and intricate procedural history
of ASARCO's challenge to the status of CERCLA regulation of min-
eral processing waste as a hazardous substance. 27 It then examines
the Ninth Circuit's rationale, analysis, and balancing of the relevant
factors in hazardous waste cleanup cases. Finally, this Casebrief
concludes that the ASARCO decision points to the crucial need for
congressional guidance and final determination concerning the ap-
propriate regulatory standard for mining processing waste under
the Bevill Amendment.28
22. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1575. For a discussion of the product versus waste
dichotomy, see infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
23. Id. at 1575.
24. Id.
25. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. pmbl. § 7.72.010 (West 1992); see also Elizabeth A.
Gordon, Note, Products Liability, The Statute of Limitations, and the Discovery Rule After
North Coast Air v. Grumman Corp., 25 W.LAME-rE L. REv. 901, 902-906 & n.39
(1989) (discussing proper application of discovery rule and running of statute of
limitations in product liability cause of action).
26. For a discussion of the historical development of ore and mineral process-
ing waste regulations, see infra notes 34-64 and accompanying text.
27. This appeal came before the Ninth Circuit on ASARCO's motion for par-
tial summary judgment regarding the status of copper smelting slag as a CERCLA
hazardous substance. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 33 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1079 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (ASARCO 11). Before the district court,
ASARCO asserted that slag and other certain mining and smelting processing
wastes were intended by Congress to be subject to RCRA regulation only. Id. at
1080. As such, ASARCO argued that regulation under CERCLA was precluded.
Id.
The district court rejected this argument adopting instead the position taken
by Louisiana-Pacific and the other logyard plaintiffs. Id. The court denied
ASARCO's motion for partial summary judgment finding that it was not the intent
of Congress in passing the Bevill Amendment to shield from CERCLA regulation
the hazardous constituents of mining and processing waste. Id.
For a discussion of the litigation related to this motion and other claims as-
serted by ASARCO, Louisiana-Pacific, and the other parties to this case, see infra
notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the possible future direction of mine processing waste
regulation under CERCLA, see infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
1996]
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II. BACKGROUND
RCRA was enacted in response to public concern over the envi-
ronment.29 RCRA, like other environmental legislation of the day,
put enormous obligations on, and gave tremendous authority to,
EPA to create and implement policies relating to the management
of hazardous wastes.30 Specifically, RCRA established a comprehen-
sive regulatory framework for the treatment, transportation, stor-
age, and disposal of hazardous wastes under Subtitle C.31 Congress
then directed EPA to promulgate regulations which would identify
characteristics of hazardous waste, list the specific hazardous wastes
subject to Subtitle C regulation, and standardize facility treatment,
storage, and disposal of such wastes.3 2 As part of its Subtitle C in-
structions, Congress further directed EPA to take into account cer-
tain criteria including "toxicity, persistence, and degradability in
nature, potential for accumulation in tissue,. . . and other hazard-
ous characteristics" when developing its regulations.33
In the area of solid waste from surface and underground
mines, Congress directed EPA to conduct comprehensive studies of
these wastes, to note any adverse effects they had on the environ-
29. See Philip Weinberg, Environmental Protection in the Next Decades: Moving
From Clean Up to Prevention, 27 Loy. LA. L. REV. 1145 (1994). Specifically, Con-
gress' enactment of RCRA, CERCLA, and other environmental acts was thought to
be a direct response to the first Earth Day observation in 1970 and the critical
writings of such writers as Rachel Carson and Garrett Hardin. Id. at 1145 & nn.1-3.
30. Donald W. Stever, Experience and Lessons of Twenty-Five Years of Environmen-
tal Law: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Headed, 27 Loy. LA. L. REv. 1105,
1109-11 (1994). This type of statute is known as command and control law. Id. at
1109 n.7. Congress through the statute announces the formation of a program
giving few details ("command") and then delegates to an administrative agency the
responsibility of giving substance to the skeletal framework ("control"). Id. The
agency must create and implement specific policies. Id. This type of congressional
rule making was criticized in AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. 607, 671-
88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) on the basis of the nondelegation doctrine.
Under this principle, Congress is to make hard policy decisions giving administra-
tive agency an "intelligible principle" before delegating its authority. Id. at 685-86.
In the case of RCRA, congressional guidance was unclear and limited. Stever,
supra, at 1110.
31. See RCRA §§ 3001-3010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6931; see also Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(discussing RCRA's
"cradle to grave" regulatory scheme); Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 393 (not-
ing RCRA's regulation of all factors related to hazardous waste management).
Subtitle C establishes the "cradle to grave" regulatory scheme governing hazardous
wastes. RCRA §§ 3001-3010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6931. Subtitle D establishes a simi-
lar comprehensive plan for solid wastes that are not hazardous. RCRA §§ 3021-
3029, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6942-6947.
32. See Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1318 (summarizing congres-
sional mandate to EPA).
33. RCRA § 3001 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (a).
6
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ment, and to make recommendations for alternative disposal meth-
ods.a4 EPA responded by promulgating proposed regulations
governing all aspects of Subtitle C hazardous waste management
and by creating a category of "special wastes."35 This category, char-
acterized by extremely high volumes of waste that pose relatively
low levels of hazard to the environment, included wastes from the
extraction, beneficiation, and processing of ores and minerals.3 6 As
such, these wastes were subject to fewer regulatory requirements
than Subtitle C hazardous wastes because they were "not amenable
to the control techniques" enunciated by EPA in its proposed regu-
lations.3 7 EPA dropped the special wastes category in its interim
final regulations, however, thereby subjecting these wastes to full
Subtitle C regulation.38
Congress enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act,39 which in-
cluded the Bevill Amendment, just prior to the effective date of
RCRA Subtitle C regulations. 40 The Bevill Amendment revived the
special wastes category dropped from EPA's interim final regula-
34. RCRA § 8002(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6982(f). See also Environmental Defense Fund,
852 F.2d at 1318-19 (pointing to need for alternative methods to lessen adverse
effects on environment); Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 393 (noting studies to
include recommendations for appropriate management action). Congress author-
ized these studies because it lacked sufficient information regarding the hazardous
nature and potential dangers posed by certain wastes, including mine waste. Hiles
& Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 393 & n.7. EPA's studies were to include checking
the source and composition of mine wastes, and the existing methods of disposal
of such wastes. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976)).
These studies were to be completed no later than 18 months after the enactment
of RCRA. RCRA § 3001(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(1).
35. Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1319. See also Hiles & Wilkinson,
supra note 4, at 393 (wastes believed to be not amenable to proposed regulatory
scheme). These regulations were promulgated on December 18, 1978. See 43 Fed.
Reg. 58,946 (1978) (EPA's proposal for management of hazardous wastes under
Subtitle C of RCRA).
36. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 393. Other "special wastes" included
cement kiln dust waste, utility waste including bottom ash waste and fly ash waste,
phosphate rock mining waste, uranium rock mining waste, oil and gas drilling
muds, and oil production brines. Id. at 393 n.14. See also Environmental Defense
Fund, 852 F.2d at 1319 (noting lack of information concerning special wastes' com-
position and environmental effects).
37. Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1319 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946,
58,992 (1978)).
38. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066, 33,174 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)). See
also Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1319 (explaining revision in hazardous
criteria led to exclusion of special waste category). These interim final regulations
were promulgated on May 19, 1980. Id.
39. Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), §§ 1002-11012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
40. Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1319. See Hiles & Wilkinson, supra
note 4, at 394. For a discussion of the Bevill Amendment, see supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
1996]
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tions and excluded these wastes from Subtitle C regulation until
EPA completed all studies mandated by Congress. 41 Furthermore,
the Bevill Amendment extended the deadline for completion of
these studies. 42 EPA broadened the scope of the mining waste ex-
clusions when it amended the interim final regulations to incorpo-
rate the Bevill Amendment.43 Specifically, EPA added solid wastes
from the smelting and refining of ores and minerals to the initial
congressional directive covering solid wastes from the extraction,
beneficiation, and processing of ores and minerals."
EPA failed to complete the Bevill Amendment special wastes
studies by the deadline. 45 Without these studies, EPA was unable to
determine whether mining wastes should be subject to RCRA Subti-
tle C regulation. 46 Consequently, the Environmental Defense Fund
sued EPA for failure to complete the mandated studies within the
time allotted and for failure to determine whether Bevill Amend-
41. Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1319 (discussing two provisions of
Bevill Amendment).
42. See RCRA § 8 002 (p), 42 U.S.C. § 6982 (p); see also RCRA § 3001 (b) (3) (A),
42 U.S.C. § 6921 (b) (3) (A) (extending exemption from regulation until six months
after studies completed). Specifically, the Bevill Amendment extended the dead-
line of RCRA § 8002(f) allowing the study of mining wastes to continue until Octo-
ber 21, 1983, and added § 8002(p) directing EPA to conduct a similar study of the
"disposal and utilization of solid waste from the extraction, beneficiation, and
processing of ores and minerals including phosphate rock and overburden from
uranium mining." Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1319 (quoting RCRA
§ 8002 (p), 42 U.S.C. § 69 8 2 (p)). Fly ash waste, bottom ash waste, slag waste, and
cement kiln dust waste were also targeted for EPA study. Id. See also RCRA
§ 8002(n),(o), 42 U.S.C. § 6982(n),(o) (listing wastes to be studied).
The Bevill Amendment also mandated that EPA exclude from Subtitle C regu-
lations these special wastes and determine, after completion of its studies, whether
subsequent RCRA regulation of such wastes was warranted. RCRA
§ 3001 (b) (3) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (b) (3) (C).
43. Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1320. See also 45 Fed. Reg. 76,618
(1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (6)-(7)); Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4,
at 395 (noting amendment also excluded some wastes from regulation).
44. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 395. EPA broadened the scope of the
mining waste exclusions as an accommodation to the mining industry. 45 Fed.
Reg. 76,618, 76,619. See also Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1320 (noting
EPA's accommodation as "temporary"). EPA questioned whether Congress
wanted to include wastes "generated in the smelting, refining and other processing
of ores and minerals that are further removed from the mining and beneficiation"
processes. 45 Fed. Reg. 76,618, 76,619.
45. Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1321.
46. Id. In fact, as of January, 1990, EPA submitted only two reports to Con-
gress: the first report on wastes from extraction and beneficiation of metallic ores,
phosphate rock, asbestos, overburden from uranium mining and oil shale (Decem-
ber 31, 1985); and the second report on wastes from the combustion of coal by
electric utility power plants (1988). Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 394 & n.20.
See also Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1322 (noting first report's limited
content).
8
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ment special wastes warranted Subtitle C regulation.47 As a result of
this suit, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered
EPA to, among other things, propose a reinterpretation of the
Bevill Amendment mining waste exclusions and to take final action
on that reinterpretation. 48
EPA narrowed the proposed scope of mining wastes subject to
Subtitle C exclusion to comply with this court order.49 Relying on
the legislative history of the Bevill Amendment, EPA determined
that congressional intent was to limit solid wastes from the process-
ing of ores and minerals and was not meant to include other
processes further removed from the mining of such raw materials. 50
After this reinterpretation, only four processing wastes from the
original list of Bevill Amendment special wastes remained. 51
The high volume, low hazard criteria for determining which
mine processing wastes would be excepted from Subtitle C hazard-
ous waste regulation was problematic for EPA.5 2 As a result, EPA
withdrew its proposed reinterpretation, thereby reinstating its ex-
pansive interpretation of the Bevill Amendment as "permissible,"
though not the only acceptable interpretation available.5 3 Thus,
47. Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1321 (discussing Concerned Citi-
zens of Adamstown v. EPA, No. 84-3041 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1985)).
48. Id. The deadline set for proposing a reinterpretation was September 30,
1985, and for final action on such proposal, September 30, 1986. Id. In addition,
the court ordered EPA to complete all studies mandated under RCRA §§ 8002(f)
and 80 0 2 (p) by December 31, 1985. Id. For a discussion of the reports completed
by EPA after this decision, see supra note 46.
49. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 395 & n.23. See also 50 Fed. Reg.
40,292 (1985).
50. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 395.
51. Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1322. The reinterpretation was
published on October 2, 1985. Id. at 1321. These wastes were: red and brown
muds from bauxite refining; phosphorgypsum from phosphoric acid plants; and
slag from primary metal smelters and phosphorus reduction facilities. Id. at 1322
(citing 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,294, 40,301). EPA used the high volume, low hazard
standard enumerated in its 1978 proposed regulations to determine which wastes
would remain. Id. The six other smeltering wastes previously excluded from Subti-
tle C regulation under EPA's expansive interpretation of the Bevill Amendment
were slated to be relisted for Subtitle C regulation. Id. EPA, however, in its report
on wastes from extraction and beneficiation of metallic ores, did not discuss its
reinterpretation of processing waste exclusions. Id.
52. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 395-96. Among the problem areas
were waste grouping and classification, and definitions of high volume and low
hazardous. Id. at 396 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 36,233, 36,234-35). Specifically, EPA
found that, although the definition of the latter terms were not unsound, its pro-
osed reinterpretation did not establish a criteria which clarified the distinction
etween processing and non-processing wastes. Environmental Defense Fund, 852
F.2d at 1323.
53. Environmental Defense Fund 852 F.2d at 1323 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 36,233,
36,234-35).
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the broad interpretation which included smelting and refining
wastes was to stand until EPA completed its mandated studies.5 4 As
might be expected, EPA's withdrawal met legal opposition by the
Environmental Defense Fund.55 Consequently, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia held EPA's withdrawal of its pro-
posed reinterpretation to be "arbitrary and capricious and contrary
to law."5 6 The court further imposed a schedule on EPA for deter-
mining which high volume processing wastes remained within the
Bevill Amendment exclusion and for completing the study of such
processing wastes which remained as exclusions.57
Furthermore, in compliance with the Environmental Defense
Fund court order, EPA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
which defined mining processing wastes and set forth proposed
rules that had the effect of removing most processing wastes from
the Bevill Amendment exclusion.5 8 Although EPA developed ex-
plicit high volume criterion requirements in this notice, it failed to
develop similar low hazard criterion. 59 EPA also addressed the
topic of processing waste streams and those factors which would al-
low a given stream to remain as a Bevill exclusion.60 Based upon its
high volume analysis of these waste streams, EPA slated fifteen min-
eral processing wastes for retention under the Bevill Amendment
exclusion. 61 Later, in early 1989, EPA enumerated its low hazard
54. Id.
55. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 396. The Environmental Defense
Fund and Hazardous Waste Treatment Council brought suit against EPA on sev-
eral allegations including a challenge to EPA's withdrawal of its proposed reinter-
pretation. Environmental Defense Fund, 852 F.2d at 1324.
56. Id. at 1331.
57. Id. Noting EPA's further statutory obligation to submit a report to Con-
gress, the timetable imposed by the court was October 15, 1988. Id. Final determi-
nations were to be made by February 15, 1989, and with respect to remaining
processing wastes, § 8002 studies were to be completed byJuly 31, 1989. Id.
58. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 396 (defining processing wastes as
solid wastes uniquely associated with mineral industry operations). See also 53 Fed.
Reg. 41,288 (1988) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (7)).
59. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 397.
60. Id. EPA analyzed individual waste streams and their associated degree of
aggregation to determine the definition of "high volume" processing wastes. 53
Fed. Reg. 41,288, 41,292 (1988) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (7)).
61. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,288 (1988) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R §
261.4(b) (7)). The 15 special wastes included slag from primary copper smelting,
slag from primary lead smelting, red and brown muds from bauxite refining,
phosphorgypsum from phosphoric acid production, and slag from elemental
phosphorous production. Id.
10
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criterion while at the same time it modified the high volume
criterion. 62
Late in 1989, EPA promulgated final regulations retaining five
processing special wastes as Bevill Amendment exceptions. 63 In ad-
dition, EPA also modified its high volume and low hazard criterion
and clarified its definition of processing wastes. 64
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
ASARCO began smelting copper from copper ore in the State
of Washington in 1905.65 For much of that time, ASARCO had an
agreement with the Metropolitan Park District of Tacoma to dump
most of its copper mining byproduct slag in the Commencement
62. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 397-98. See also 54 Fed. Reg. 15,316
(1989) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(7)). By adopting a low haz-
ard criteria and modifying its earlier notice, EPA reduced the 15 mining process-
ing wastes list down to 6 wastes including slag from primary copper smelting, slag
from primary lead smelting, red and brown muds from bauxite refining,
phosphorgypsum from phosphoric acid production, slag from elemental phos-
phorus production, and furnace scrubber blowdown from elemental phosphorus
production. Id. at 15,354. In addition, EPA conditionally retained most of the
removed processing wastes in its listing of 33 processing wastes which would be
subject to additional evaluation to determine if they met the new hazard criterion.
Id.
63. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 398. EPA also reduced the list of 33
conditionally retained processing wastes to 20. 54 Fed. Reg. 36,592, 36,641-42
(1988) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a)(2)(i), (iii),
261.4 (b) (7) (i), (ii)). Subsequently, EPA proposed to remove 7 of the 20 condition-
ally retained processing wastes. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 399 n.47. In-
stead, EPA removed only five. Id. at 400. See also 55 Fed. Reg. 2322, 2353 (1990)
(codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4(b) (7), 262.23(e)).
64. Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 399 (describing modifications to high
volume and low hazard criterion). On January 23, 1990, EPA promulgated a final
regulation permanently reducing the list of 20 conditionally retained to 15. Id. at
400 (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 2322 (1990) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.4(b) (7))).
65. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1570. ASARCO maintained a copper mill in Ruston,
Washington. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1450, 1451 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (granting successor and purchaser of copper smelt-
ing slag processing and marketing company motion for summary judgment on
ASARCO's third party suit), aff'd, 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990) (ASARCO 1). It
was the slag from this mill which was processed and marketed. Id. ASARCO conse-
quently ceased its operations in March, 1985. Id.
Smelting is part of the mining process used to change raw ore materials to
refined mineral products. WEBSTER'S NiwrH NEW COLLEGIATE DicrnoNARY 1113
(1984). The raw materials are first extracted from the earth; then, through the
process known as beneficiation, the ore is crushed and ground in preparation for
smelting. Gerrard, supra note 4, at 1066 n.114. Smelting separates the mineral
from the ore either by physical or chemical techniques, the latter process often
producing volumes of byproduct. Id. In ASARCO, the copper processing by-
product produced was slag. Id.
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Bay.66 In 1973, ASARCO decided to market, rather than dump, its
slag and contracted to resell as much of the byproduct as possible
with a portion of the proceeds going to ASARCO. 67 The con-
tracting company successfully marketed the slag as ballast to six lo-
gyards,68 which subsequently hauled their used slag and woodwaste
mixture to a landfill. 69 In 1986, after several years of state and fed-
eral investigations, the landfill along with each of the logyard sites
required formal CERCLA cleanup for heavy metal contamina-
tions.70 A barrage of litigation ensued.
First, Louisiana-Pacific sued ASARCO under CERCLA for re-
sponse costs for cleanup of its own logyard and for contribution or
indemnification for its liability for the cleanup of the landfill.7 '
ASARCO filed a counterclaim against Louisiana-Pacific under CER-
CLA and Washington state law.72 ASARCO also brought numerous
66. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1570. The agreement with the park district required
ASARCO to maintain a breakwater at the dumping site. Id.
67. Id. See also Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 5 F.3d 431, 432 (9th
Cir. 1993) (ASARCO IV).
ASARCO started its marketing efforts in 1973 and solicited the services of
Black Knight, Inc. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1570. Black Knight decided to market the
byproduct as a ballast in logyards. Id. The logyards used the slag as a stabilizer to
make the ground firmer for the storage of logs and to ease operation of heavy
equipment. Id. at 1570-71. Once the slag became too diluted with other debris to
maintain its stabilizing function, it was removed, hauled away, and replaced with a
new load. Id. at 1571.
Black Knight was a subsidiary of Industrial Mineral Products, Inc. (IMP).
ASARCO IV, 5 F.3d at 432. ASARCO tried unsuccessfully to join IMP, a dissolved
corporation, as a third-party defendant for contribution or indemnification for
CERCLA cleanup costs. Id. at 433. See also infra note 73 and accompanying text.
68. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1570, 1571 n.1.
69. Id. at 1571. In 1978, the logyards began hauling their used slag/wood-
waste to the B&L Landfill located in Tacoma. Id. The six logyards listed as con-
taminated by ASARCO's slag included: (1) Louisiana-Pacific site owned and
operated by Louisiana-Pacific; (2) Portac site owned by the Port of Tacoma and
operated by Portac; (3) Wasser & Winters site owned by the Port of Tacoma and
operated by Wasser & Winters; (4) Cascade Timber site owned by the Port of Ta-
coma and operated by Cascade Timber; (5) Murray-Pacific #1 site owned and oper-
ated by Murray-Pacific; and (6) Murray-Pacific #2 site owned by Port of Tacoma
and operated by Murray-Pacific. Id. at 1571 n.1.
1 70. Id. at 1571. EPA, in 1980, discovered high concentrations of heavy metals
in water runoff from one of the six logyard sites. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1571. In
cooperation with EPA, the Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE) deter-
mined that the likely cause of the contamination was the ASARCO slag. Id. For-
mal cleanup actions did not commence until 1986. Id. The B&L Landfill was
found to be contaminated by ASARCO slag dumped by the six logyards. Id. at
1571 n.1. The owners and operators of the six logyards as well as the owner and
operator of the B&L Landfill, who also owned the two trucking companies that
transported the slag to the landfill, were held liable for the cleanup costs at each of
the six logyards and the landfill under CERCLA. Id.
71. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1571.
72. Id.
12
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third-party claims against some of the other logyards that disposed
their slag and woodwaste mixture at the landfill. 73 Some of the
third-party defendants then counterclaimed. 74
Next, the Port of Tacoma, as owner of several of the contami-
nated logyard sites, sued ASARCO for response costs under CER-
CLA and Washington state law, and for contribution or
indemnification for cleanup of the landfill. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington consolidated the
Louisiana-Pacific and Port of Tacoma suits to include all six log-
yards as plaintiffs acting in concert against ASARCO as the sole de-
fendant.75 The state law claims asserted under the Hazardous
Waste Management Act (HWMA) 7 6 and the Washington Products
Liability Act (WPLA) 77 were tried by a jury, while the CERCLA
claims were tried by the court.78 All other claims made on motion
by ASARCO were dismissed. 79
73. Id. ASARCO's third-party claims and motions include: (1) a suit against
William Fjetland, owner and operator of the B&L Landfill who also owned and
operated the trucking companies that transported the logyard mixture, id.; (2) a
suit against L-Bar Products, Inc., successor corporation of IMP, for share of CER-
CIA response costs liability incurred during IMP's activities at ASARCO, ASARCO
, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1451 (granting L-Bar's motion for summary judg-
ment); (3) a motion for partial summary judgment regarding status of copper
smelting as a CERCLA hazardous substance, Louisiana-Pacific v. ASARCO, Inc., 33
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1079 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (predecessor of focus case), aff'd,
24 F.3d 1565 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 780 (1995); (4) a suit against
United States Gypsum Interiors, Inc. (USGI), producer of mineral wool which
dumped its processing by-product at B&L Landfill between 1978 and 1980, for
response costs for cleanup of the landfill, Louisiana-Pacific v. ASARCO, Inc., 735 F.
Supp. 358, 360 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (ASARCO 1M1) (denying USGI's motion for sum-
mary judgment); and (5) a motion to amend complaint relating it back to date of
original complaint in order to add IMP as a third-party defendant for CERCLA
response costs for the cleanup of B&L Landfill, ASARCO IV, 5 F.3d at 431.
74. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1571. The counterclaims were brought against
ASARCO under CERCLA and various Washington state laws including its Model
Toxic Control Act (MTCA), Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA), and
Washington Products Liability Act (WPLA). Id. In addition, common law claims
of trespass, nuisance, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and breach
of warranty were asserted against ASARCO. Id.
75. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1571 n.2. William Fjetland, owner and operator of
the B&L Landfill, and his companies remained the sole third-party defendants. Id.
76. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105.005. (West 1992).
77. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010. (West 1992).
78. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1571.
79. Id. ASARCO moved to have some of the common law claims against it
dismissed. Id. The district court, in granting ASARCO's motion, dismissed all the
common law claims finding them preempted by WPLA. Id. The court also dis-
missed a claim for a private cause of action brought under the Model Toxic Con-
trol Act (MTCA), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.010. (amended 1993), claims
finding no ground for a private cause of action under this act. Id. The Washing-
ton legislature, however, amended MTCA after oral arguments were made on this
1996]
13
Gunter: Statutory Interpretation - Ninth Circuit Sets Forth Independent F
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
194 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. VII: p. 181
The jury found ASARCO liable to each of the plaintiffs under
HWMA and WPLA. 80 In determining the damages, the jury found
ASARCO to be 75% to 100% liable under Washington state law for
cleanup costs at the logyard sites.81 The district court also found
ASARCO liable under CERCLA,82 and determined ASARCO's com-
parative fault to be 79% to 100% for the cleanup costs at each site,
including the landfill.83 ASARCO filed an appeal, and plaintiffs
filed cross-appeals to the Ninth Circuit.84
IV. DISCUSSION
A. CERCLA Regulation of Bevill Amendment Special Wastes
The question of whether the special wastes exclusion of the
Bevill Amendment, as found in subsection 101 (14) (C) of CERCLA,
appeal. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1571 n.3. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's dismissal and remanded the MTCA issue. Id. at 1583.
80. Id. at 1571.
81. Id. at 1572.
82. Id. at 1571.
83. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1572. The district court applied these percentages to
compute ASARCO's liability for deanup activity at the Portac site. Id. The court
then awarded attorneys fees and costs under CERCLA and Washington state law
applying the respective comparative fault percentages. Id.
84. Id. On appeal, ASARCO reasserted its contention that slag as excepted
from the definition of hazardous substance under CERCLA § 101 (14) (C) is there-
fore completely excepted from CERCLA regulation. Id. This position was first
taken in ASARCO's motion for partial summary judgment regarding status of cop-
per smelting slag as CERCLA hazardous substance. See ASARCO II, 33 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1080. ASARCO alleged that its mining operations, through the Bevill
Amendment, were only subject to regulation under RCRA. Id. Thus, it was com-
pletely precluded from liability under CERCLA. Id.
ASARCO further alleged on appeal that the meaning of CERCLA § 101(14) is
not clear from its language alone and the legislative history of the statute is ambig-
uous. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1573. It also asserted that EPA's interpretation of the
section is unreasonable since such a reading would render the Bevill Amendment
completely nullified and meaningless. Id. at 1574.
Similar arguments were made by the petitioners and rejected by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Eagle-Picher. See Eag/e-Picher,
759 F.2d at 927. The court in that case found these contentions unpersuasive due
to the lack of evidence, including citations in CERCLA, legislative history, or the
record of the case, supporting petitioners' assertions that all mining wastes have
constituents which are hazardous substances under CERCLA, thus rendering as
meaningless the interpretation that § 9601(14) (C) was meant to be a total exemp-
tion. Id. at 927-28. ASARCO tried to address this evidentiary problem by offering
expert testimony that all or virtually all Bevill Amendment wastes fall within one or
more of other § 9601(14) definitions of hazardous substances. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at
1574. On this point, the Ninth Circuit simply referred to its reliance on the clear
and plain language of the statute. Id. The court concluded that if Congress in-
tended to exclude the Bevill Amendment wastes from CERCLA regulation, Con-
gress would have included an express general exemption similar to the general
exclusion for petroleum products enunciated at the end of § 9601(14). Id.
14
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completely precluded these wastes from hazardous waste regulation
under CERCLA, was one of first impression for the Ninth Circuit. 5
The court commenced its substantive analysis by adopting the ap-
proach taken by the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.8 6 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the special wastes
exception in subsection C did not prevent those wastes from regula-
tion under other subsections of section 101 (14) of CERCLA.87 Spe-
cifically, the ASARCO court found that the Bevill Amendment
exception under subsection C has "no bearing" on whether slag, as
one such excepted waste, found in its component forms is excepted
from regulation under the remaining subsections of section
101(14) of CERCLA.88 In order to completely exclude the Bevill
Amendment special wastes from CERCLA regulation, the court rea-
soned that a general exception, applicable to all of the subsections,
would be required.8 9
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit suggested that, at the very least,
Congress could have made a general exception applicable to the
relevant subsections of section 101(14) which encompass slag
85. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1573.
86. Id. The approach taken in Eagle-Picher was to limit the specific Bevill
Amendment in subsection 101 (14) (C) to apply only to that subsection and not to
section 101(14) in general. Id.
87. Id. at 1573. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Eagle-
Picher addressed the issue of whether CERCLA authorized EPA to place certain
mining companies and an electric utility company, which produced mining wastes
or fly waste, on the National Priorities List (NPL). Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 925,
926. In denying the companies' petitions for review of an EPA order, the Eag'e-
Picher court concluded that "a substance is a 'hazardous substance' within the
meaning of CERCLA if it qualifies under any of the several subparagraphs of sec-
don 101 (14)." Id. at 927. This finding was deemed consistent with EPA's construc-
tion of the statutory provision. Id.
88. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1573.
89. Id. Here, the court analyzed Congress' treatment of petroleum products
under CERCLA. Id. Congress made a general exception applicable to all of the
subsections of CERCIA § 101(14) for petroleum products. Id. Specifically, the
term "hazardous substance"
does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof
which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous sub-
stance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the
term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural
gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such
synthetic gas).
CERCLA § 101 (14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). It is this general exception found at the
end of the section, which both the Ninth Circuit in the instant case and the District
of Columbia Circuit in Eagle-Picher, found to be persuasive in ruling that the spe-
cific exception in CERCLA § 101(14) (C) did not apply to the entire section. See
Eage-Picher, 759 F.2d at 927.
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through its components.90 This measure would have the effect of
completely excepting slag from CERCLA regulation. 91 Since, how-
ever, Congress did not make such an exception, the Ninth Circuit
found no basis to read an exception into the statute. 92 Thus, the
ASARCO court relied upon the plain language and structure of sec-
tion 101 of CERCLA, and EPA's construction of the statute, to con-
clude that the Bevill Amendment exception for slag applied only to
subsection C. 93 The court held that if slag is found within the defi-
nition of hazardous substance under any other subsections of sec-
tion 101 (14), then it could be regulated under CERCLA.94
The Ninth Circuit next considered, arguendo, ASARCO's con-
tention that the statute was ambiguous given its legislative history.95
To establish the proper course of judicial review of an administra-
tive agency's statutory interpretation, the court looked to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.96 The Ninth Circuit deter-
90. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1573. The basic premise that a general exception for
Bevill Amendment special wastes or a specific exception for slag and its compo-
nents were necessary was deemed by the Ninth Circuit as being "logical" in light of
Congress' treatment of petroleum products. Id. For a discussion of the general
exception for petroleum products and natural gas under CERCLA, see supra note
89.
91. See id. at 1573.
92. Id. In fact, the court is not permitted to read into a statute its own con-
struction. Id. For a discussion of this prohibition, see infra note 97.
93. Id. at 1573.
94. Id. EPA construed the statute as only excepting slag from consideration
as a hazardous substance under subsection C. Id. at 1572. If, however, the slag
released substances that could be deemed hazardous under any of the other sub-
sections, EPA concluded that slag was subject to CERCLA regulation. Id. at 1573,
1574. See also 48 Fed. Reg. 40,663 (1983).
Once again, the Ninth Circuit in reaching the above conclusion followed the
approach of the District of Columbia Circuit in Eage-Picher. In the latter case, the
District of Columbia Circuit noted its obligation to accept an agency's reasonable
construction of a statute it administers. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. United
States EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 927 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In particular, the court applied
the principles for judicial review of an administrative agency's statutory interpreta-
tion set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id.
For a discussion of the judicial standard of review of an agency's statutory
construction enumerated in Chevron, see infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
95. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1573. ASARCO offered as legislative history a Senate
report on a draft of CERCLA. Id. In relevant part, the report stated "[i]t should
be noted that any substance or material for which regulation is specifically sus-
pended by Act of Congress under the Solid Waste Disposal Act is excluded from
designation for the purpose of S. 1480, notwithstanding the presence in such sub-
stance of any hazardous or toxic chemical." S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
96. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1573 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840). In Chevron, the
Court faced the issue of whether EPA's construction of the Clean Air Act term
16
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mined, based on the principles enunciated in Chevron, that even if
the statute was ambiguous on its face, the court was not free to sim-
ply create and impose its own statutory construction, as ASARCO
suggested. 97 The ASARCO court found that when an agency has
interpreted the meaning of a statute, the next inquiry proscribed by
Chevron for the court to consider is whether that construction is
permissible.9 8 Thus, the court concluded that EPA's interpretation
of section 101 (14) of CERCLA, that the Bevill Amendment excep-
tions only applied to subsection C, was reasonable given the plain
language of the statute.99
"stationary source" was reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. Specifically, the
Court determined whether the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia made
a legal error thus resulting in an erroneous judgment by setting aside EPA's con-
struction of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 842. The Chevron court found that in adopt-
ing a "static judicial definition of the term 'stationary source' " the court of
appeals erred. Id. Thus, the Court held EPA's definition of the term permissible.
Id. at 866.
In its analysis of a court's review of an administering agency's construction,
the Chevron court established a two-prong test. Id. at 842-44. The first prong re-
quires the court to determine whether Congress has spoken directly to the exact
question at issue. Id. at 842. If congressional intent is clear, then the inquiry ends.
Id. As noted by the Court, the judiciary "as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43 (footnote
omitted).
The second prong applies when the court determines that Congress has not
spoken directly to the exact question at issue. Id. at 843. Thus, if a "statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the court must address whether
the administering agency's construction of the statute is permissible. Id. In estab-
lishing this prong, the Chevron court reasoned:
[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provi-
sion of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly con-
trary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on
a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted).
97. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). The Chevron court stated, "[i]f,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction .
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
98. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1573 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
99. Id. at 1574. The Ninth Circuit's determination of the reasonableness of
EPA's construction of CERCLA § 101 (14) is circular. Under the Chevron test, only
if the statute is ambiguous and congressional intent is unclear, does the court in-
quire whether the agency's construction is permissible, i.e., reasonable. Id. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.ll (noting court need not determine whether agency's
construction is only one permissible). Here, however, the Ninth Circuit in reach-
ing its conclusion with respect to the second prong used the proscriptions of the
first prong, namely, the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. ASARCO,
24 F.3d at 1573. This analysis begs the question since the two prongs of Chevron
are mutually exclusive. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
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In relying on the plain meaning and structure of section 101 of
CERCLA, the Ninth Circuit rejected ASARCO's argument that
EPA's interpretation makes meaningless the Bevill Amendment ex-
ceptions in subsection C.100 Once again, the court concluded that
since Congress expressly granted petroleum products a general ex-
ception from all CERCLA regulation, but only exempted slag under
ASARCO further argued that the United States Supreme Court in INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), gave no deference to an administering
agency's construction of a statute when a question of pure statutory construction
arose. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1574. The Ninth Circuit in rejecting this argument
distinguished Cardoza-Fonseca as being derived from the first prong of the Chevron
test. Id. (citing NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,
AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987)). Since ASARCO's principle contention was
that the statute is ambiguous, thus falling under the second prong, the court
found ASARCO's argument in conflict with Chevron. Id. See also NLRB, 484 U.S. at
123 (reconciling Cardoza-Fonseca and Chevron decisions).
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of ASARCO's argument based on Cardoza-Fonseca
failed to address the substantive differences between that case and the instant case.
In Cardoza-Fonseca, the United States Supreme Court faced the issue of whether two
standards for providing relief to an otherwise deportable alien were the same. 480
U.S. at 448. The first standard, found in the Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 243(h), required the withholding of deportation of such an alien if it is demon-
strated that "it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecu-
tion" upon return to his country. Id. at 423 (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407
(1984)).
The second standard, found in the Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a),
authorized the discretionary grant of asylum to such an alien who is unable or
unwilling to return to his country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." Cardozo, 480 U.S. at 423. It was against this
backdrop that the Court concluded, "[t]he question whether Congress intended
the two standards to be identical is a pure question of statutory construction for
the courts to decide." Id. at 446.
Furthermore, the Court distinguished this type of narrow question for judicial
review from that which arises when a "question of interpretation ... in which the
agency is required to apply either or both standards to a particular set of facts." Id.
at 448. It was the former narrow question of pure statutory construction which the
Cardoza-Fonseca court found to be "well within the province of the Judiciary." Id.
ASARCO dealt with the latter question, that of statutory interpretation as applied to
a specific set of facts.
100. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1574. This is identical to the first argument
presented by the petitioners in Eagle-Picher. See Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 927. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in rejecting this argument, pointed
to the petitioners' lack of evidence in CERCLA, its legislative history, or the record
of the case which supported their proposition that all or virtually all mining waste
and fly ash "have constituents which are 'hazardous substance.' " Id. at 928. Fur-
thermore, the court concluded that "[w]ithout a showing that Congress believed
that the regulation of mining wastes and fly ash under other subparagraphs of
section 101(14) would render the exception in subparagraph (C) meaningless, we
are disinclined to reject the plain meaning of section 101(14)." Id.
To overcome this evidentiary deficiency, ASARCO offered the expert testi-
mony of a doctor of metallurgical engineering who concluded that all or virtually
all Bevill Amendment wastes would fall under one of the other subsections of CER-
CLA § 101 (14). ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1574. The Ninth Circuit found this testimony
unpersuasive. Id.
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subsection 101 (14) (C), slag can be regulated as a hazardous sub-
stance under other CERCLA provisions. 101
B. Slag: Product or Waste?
The Ninth Circuit next considered the question of whether the
sale of slag can simultaneously be the sale of a product under state
law and the disposal of a hazardous waste under federal law. 102 An-
swering the question in the affirmative, the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished the purposes and independent functions of these two
laws. 103 It determined that WPLA represented the State of Wash-
ington's codification of common law products liability, while CER-
CLA represented federal environmental law. 104 Thus, the two laws
addressed different concerns which the ASARCO court found to be
mutually exclusive.' 05 To support this conclusion, the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on several federal court decisions which imposed CER-
CLA liability on wastes also deemed to be products. 10 6 The court
determined that since ASARCO wanted to discard its slag, whether
by resale or disposal, a finding of slag as a product under WPLA
does not preclude a finding of slag as a waste under CERCLA.10 7
101. 24 F.3d at 1574.
102. Id. The jury after special instructions found slag to be a product under
WPLA. Id. In relevant part, WPLA defined a product to be "any object possessing
intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an assembled whole or as a component
part or parts and produced for introduction into trade or commerce." WAsH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(3) (West 1992).
At the same time, the district court found slag to be a hazardous substance
under CERCLA. 24 F.3d at 1574. In particular, the district court concluded "the
Bevill. Amendment did not intend to shield hazardous constituents of waste pro-
duced by mining and smelting operations." ASARCO I, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
at 1080. Since slag contained constituents listed as hazardous under CERCLA, it
was deemed to be hazardous waste. Id.
103. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1575.
104. Id.
105. Id. The court found that CERCLA is given a broad interpretation in
order to achieve its remedial goals. Id.
106. Id. Specifically, the court cited several district court decisions holding
that a mine processing byproduct, if sold, is regulable as both a product and waste.
ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1575. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 241 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (concluding CERCLA's "hazardous substances"
definition fails to distinguish between sale of a product for primary use or sale of
waste for disposal purposes); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297
(N.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting characteristic of disposal arrangements as "sales" so as
to circumvent CERCLA liability); and United States v. A&F Materials Co., 582 F.
Supp. 842, 844-45 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (finding hazardous waste definition as expansive
to include hazardous materials which are sometimes sold or reused).
107. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1575. The court further distinguished cases in
which the sale of a product was not deemed to be disposal of waste for the purpose
of imposing CERCLA liability. Id. at 1575 n.6. These cases were distinguishable,
according to the court, because the products were not byproducts for disposal. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of whether the Bevill Amendment special wastes, as excluded from
subsection 101(14) (C) regulation, are completely excluded from
CERCLA regulation under all subsections of section 101(14). 108
Therefore, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit and the District of
Columbia Circuit provide the only precedent for subsequent court
decisions regarding the scope of the Bevill Amendment excep-
tion.109 Specifically, the ASARCO court has determined that unless
there is a clear and explicit general exclusion from CERCLA sec-
tion 101(14) regulation or, alternatively, unless the administrative
agency interprets such a general exclusion, the special wastes listed
under subsection C may be regulated under any other subsection of
section 101 (14).110 This approach significantly limits the ability of
the mining industry to circumvent CERCLA regulation of its haz-
ardous waste disposal.1"1 Furthermore, in light of EPA's failure to
complete its studies of mine processing wastes, the Ninth Circuit
has given CERCLA a broad interpretation which is consistent with
prior court opinions.112
The future of mine processing waste regulation and the Bevill
Amendment exception under CERCLA may be given a new direc-
tion in light of CERCLA's pending expiration.113 Without further
108. Eagle-Picher is the leading federal court case concluding that mining
wastes are not excluded from CERCLA regulation if the wastes or any of their
components fall within one of the other definitions of hazardous substance in sec-
tion 101(14). Royster, supra note 12, at 634 n.594. The petition for a writ of certi-
orari was denied in ASARCO. See ASARCO, 115 S. Ct. 780 (1995) (granting leave to
file amici curiae briefs to American Petroleum Institute and Alaska Miners
Association).
109. For a discussion of related federal district court decisions, see supra note
12.
110. ASARCO, 24 F.3d at 1574.
111. For a discussion of the current treatment of mining processing waste, see
supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
112. See Hiles & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 394 n.20 (noting, as ofJanuary 1,
1990, only two reports have been submitted by EPA to Congress in conjunction
with § 8002 mandated studies). EPA promulgated its final regulations on January
23, 1990, without completing these studies. Id. at 400. See also 55 Fed. Reg. 2353
(1990) (modifying both high volume and low hazard criteria as well as finalizing
conditionally retained processing wastes list).
113. CERCLA is slated to expire in 1995 unless Congress reauthorizes it.
Richard E. Bartelt & David E. Polter, Analysis and Perspective: Summary of the Proposed
Superfund Reform Act of 1994, Current Developments, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 608 (July
29, 1994). The Clinton administration and the 103d Congress have attempted to
revise and overhaul CERCLA in what is known as the Superfund Reform Act of
1994. Id. The major changes proposed in the 1994 Act are intended to:
0 Enhance EPA's information-gathering activities and ability to respond
to emergencies and to perform removal actions;
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congressional clarification on the topic, it appears certain that mine
processing wastes in general, and the Bevill Amendment in particu-
lar, will remain subject to CERCLA regulation with few exceptions.
Karin M. Gunter
Sharply limit the application and use of strict, joint and several liability
specifically as it applies to de minimis parties and those who settle with
the government in accordance with a new liability allocation system;
e Create an allocatica system designed to apportion liability among PRPs
based on the volume and toxicity of a PRP's wastes and the degree of care
exhibited by the PRP in the management of those wastes;
" Limit the liability of municipalities;
" Limit the liability of lenders who acquire contaminated properties;
" Create more flexibility within the remedy selection process while also
establishing national acceptable risk standards expressed as numerical
concentration levels;
e Increase opportunities for public participation in the decision-making
process and incorporate environmental justice concerns within the CER-
CLA process;
o Encourage the voluntary cleanup of contaminated sites through state
lead programs and thereby avoiding the need for listing on the National
Priorities List;
o Allow states to seek, through contracts and cooperative agreements
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, delegation of remedy se-
lection and enforcement authorities;
o Create a fund and claim resolution procedure for insureds to collect
eligible response costs from their insurers; and
e Establish minimum standards for performance of Phase I Environmen-
tal Site Assessments and standards for organizations certifying environ-
mental professionals.
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